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 LBOs slash R&D: So what?
 Jeffrey S. Harrison, University of Central Florida
 Much has been written recently about the negative impact of leveraged buyouts,
 or LBOs, on research and development (R&D) expenditures. Corporate R&D
 spending has been identified as a key determinant of market share in many
 global industries. However, evidence to test the assumption as to whether LBOs
 really lead to reductions in R&D is mixed. Furthermore, researchers who study
 LBOs have not attended to the question of whether such supposed reductions in
 R&D, if they exist, are damaging to firms and/or the economy.
 William Long from the Center for Economic Studies and David Ravenscraft from
 the University of North Carolina set out to answer these questions concerning
 the impact of LBOs on R&D expenditures and performance. They argued that the
 high levels of debt associated with LBOs should be associated with reductions
 in R&D spending for several reasons:
 1. Managers cannot reveal all of the pertinent information concerning
 promising R&D projects to their debt providers for competitiveness
 reasons. Consequently, the debt holders, whose power increases in an
 LBO, are less likely to agree to new projects.
 2. Debt providers are also hesitant to fund risky R&D projects because they
 recognize the downside risk but fail to attend to the potential gains.
 3. R&D expenditures result in the creation of assets that are not easily sold
 in the event of financial problems.
 4. Financial controls, which are assumed to be associated with high debt
 levels in LBOs, discourage long-term investments such as R&D because
 of their short-term impact on profitability.
 5. The added stress and time commitment associated with an LBO can
 distract managers away from important issues such as innovation.
 6. Debt payments associated with LBOs often reduce tax burdens, making
 the tax benefits from R&D less attractive.
 7. Debt places restrictions on how much cash flow managers can allocate to
 other areas such as R&D.
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 To investigate the notion that LBOs are associated with reductions in R&D, three
 years of pre-LBO R&D expenditures, divided by sales, were compared with three
 years after the buyout. Strong support was found for the idea that LBOs hurt
 R&D. The size of the decline was dramatic, with R&D/sales ratios dropping by
 almost 40 percent.
 However, other findings seemed to indicate that the R&D reductions, although
 significant, might not have been as important as they appeared on the surface.
 Long and Ravenscraft linked R&D directly to performance and discovered that
 the reductions had no significant impact on operating margins, either in the
 short or longer term-up to five years after the LBO.
 Furthermore, they found that most, but not all, of the firms engaged in LBOs
 were "low tech." The average R&D/sales in these companies was less than one
 half of the R&D/sales of the manufacturing companies in their comparison
 group. Consequently, LBOs tended to occur in firms in which R&D was not as
 important as it was in other firms. The researchers explained that executives
 and financiers who orchestrate LBOs may seek low R&D firms to avoid the
 negative consequences associated with R&D cutbacks that are typically a part
 of LBO restructuring.
 This study provides perhaps the strongest evidence to date that LBOs are
 associated with declines in R&D. However, the policy implications are also
 important. If LBOs occur primarily in firms in which R&D is not important and if
 R&D reductions do not significantly damage performance, then they do not pose
 a business or public policy problem, at least from an R&D perspective. Much of
 the R&D that gets cut must be marginal, low-productivity R&D. So if LBOs kill
 R&D, so what?
 .............................................................................................................................................................................
 Source: "LBOs, Debt and R&D Intensity," by
 William F. Long and David J. Ravenscraft,
 Strategic Management Journal, 12 (Special
 Issue), 1993, 119-135.
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